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Abstract 
This paper investigates the efficiency and equity of morning peak ramp control schemes in a freeway corridor with limited 
capacity. In terms of efficiency, both short-run and long-run optimal ramp control schemes are obtained by minimizing the total 
travel cost and maximizing the total social benefit along the corridor. It is found that for a short-run optimum with inelastic 
demand, the morning peak period is of the same duration for different on-ramp locations. But for a long-run optimum with elastic 
demand, the peak duration for various on-ramps increases with the local capacity elasticity of demand. In terms of equity, two 
measures are defined from a demand-based viewpoint and a space-based viewpoint. It is shown that the short-run optimal ramp 
control scheme is perfectly fair from a demand-based equity viewpoint. Consequently, two typical ramp control schemes—a 
perfect demand-based equity scheme and a perfect space-based equity scheme—are introduced and compared with the long-run 
optimal ramp control scheme in terms of efficiency and equity. It is shown that the long-run optimal ramp control scheme 
without an equity constraint is more unfair than the perfect demand-based equity scheme from a space-based equity viewpoint. 
Numerical simulations using survey data from China suggest that the perfect demand-based equity scheme attains an economic 
welfare level that is very close to the optimal one. 
 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
Traffic congestion has become increasingly serious in most large cities. This problem has been traditionally 
addressed by widening existing highways or constructing new ones. However, due to the right-of-way acquisition 
for highways and costly construction investment, the capacity expansion approach has become increasingly 
unattractive in recent decades (Lindley, 1987, Johnston et al., 1995). Ramp control, as an effective method in 
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allocating limited highway capacity, has been widely adopted by policymakers due to its effectiveness in 
establishing orderly traffic conditions (Zhang and Levinson, 2010). 
 
The concept of ramp control came about because of the need to control on-ramp traffic flows entering mainline 
segments of freeways so as to achieve some given objectives for traffic management (Zhang and Recker, 1999). One 
common objective is to minimize the total travel delay by maximizing the summation of cumulative arrival flows 
given a predetermined level of departure flows (Levinson and Zhang, 2006, Zhang and Shen, 2010). However, the 
travel delay is not the only cost commuters, who generally have a preferred arrival time in the morning peak period, 
have to bear. As Vickrey pointed out, commuters arriving early or late experience schedule delay costs in addition to 
their travel delay costs (Vickrey, 1969). Taking both travel delay cost and schedule delay cost into account, Arnott 
et al. (1993) showed that the total system cost could decrease if an appropriate ramp control policy is implemented 
in a fixed-capacity, point-queue network without route choice. They investigated the problem under elastic demand 
but did not derive the optimal ramp control schemes. 
 
As most of the existing studies in the literature have focused on the effects of ramp control schemes assuming 
inelastic demand, little attention has been paid to the commuters’ long-run responses to ramp control schemes. In 
spite of being more responsive to short-run changes in traffic demands in the temporal domain, the mechanism of 
ramp control does affect the full trip costs of the commuters and the traffic demands in the spatial domain. A 
resident will decide how often to travel by car according to the full trip cost which varies with his or her home 
location along the freeway corridor. Thus, ramp control schemes also play an instructive role in generating trip 
demand.  
 
In this paper, we investigate various ramp control schemes for a freeway with multiple on-ramp meters that serve 
a corridor city during the morning peak period. The freeway is uniform in width and thus has limited capacity. The 
local authorities first allocate the freeway capacity to various entry ramps. The commuters determine their car trip 
frequencies and then make their trip-timing decisions. The on-ramp queuing delay cost for a particular departure 
time is captured by the bottleneck model of Vickrey (1969), while the auto demand along the corridor city is fixed in 
the short run and varies with the full trip cost in the long run. The resulting problem becomes an optimization 
problem with an equilibrium constraint. Hence, we simplify and reformulate Vickrey’s bottleneck model into a 
variational problem. 
 
This paper makes one important additional assumption, and that is “no-inside queue” in the freeway with our 
ramp control schemes. It is assumed that the sum of all the on-ramp metering rates does not exceed the freeway 
capacity anywhere because the traffic volume can never exceed the available capacity. This assumption is 
reasonable for two reasons. The first is due to the instability of queuing. Since we focus on the equilibrium for the 
whole peak period, the dynamic evolution of an inside queue cannot be captured by our current model. The second 
reason is that an inside queue may give rise to the spill-back phenomenon and temporarily block the downstream on-
ramps, which is regarded as a huge waste (Lago and Daganzo, 2007). In fact, the “no-inside queue” assumption has 
often been adopted in the literature (Allsop, 1974; Payne and Thompson, 1974; Yang and Yagar, 1994 and Yang et 
al., 1994; Shen and Zhang, 2009). These ramp control schemes, which exclude inside queues, have obvious benefits 
for mathematical modeling, such as predictable travel times. They have also been shown to be efficient in achieving 
optimal network performance in a monocentric network (Zhang and Shen, 2010), which is similar to the network 
studied in this paper. Thus, the no-inside queue assumption is adopted in this study. 
 
Besides ramp control efficiency, the equity of different ramp control schemes has also been considered in the 
literature. However, the definition and measure of equity in transportation are varied. Some use the Gini coefficient 
drawn from Lorenz curves (Levinson and Zhang, 2002, 2004, 2006; Yin et al., 2004); some prefer the weighted sum 
of the average delay at various on-ramps (Zhang and Levinson, 2005; Zhang and Shen, 2010). Most of the previous 
studies have described a partially conflicting relationship between efficiency and equity—as one rises the other falls 
(Kotsialos and Papageorgiou, 2001, among others). Zhang and Levinson (2004) suggested that the most efficient 
ramp control strategy is the least equitable one. It was believed that the system efficiency cannot be achieved 
without affecting equity. Recently, Zhang and Shen (2010) proved that the system optimum cost can be obtained by 
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excluding all inside queues. They provided a method to find the most equitable ramp control policy among the 
system optimal schemes. Their insightful findings show that the objectives of efficiency and equity do not 
necessarily conflict with each other, but can be achieved simultaneously. 
 
The study of ramp control in a corridor network can also improve our understanding of travel cost variation along 
the freeway. In the literature on urban economics, a traditional method of modeling the congested freeway is based 
on the laissez-faire allocation of highway capacity, which is achieved if no control is implemented on entry to and 
exit from the highway. Thus, the cost of driving one unit distance at a certain location is assumed to be an increasing 
function of the local traffic volume, which is represented by the total population living in the area around that 
location (Anas et al., 2000). This assumption is unreasonable if the physical traffic queue is considered. Daganzo 
(1998) found that the spillover queue will spread backward and may even gridlock the highway by several blocks 
and in certain situations the time-dependent traffic assignment problem with physical queues would be chaotic in 
nature. Recently, Lago and Daganzo (2007) considered an idealized two-origin, single-destination network with 
limited storage space to analytically study the queue spillovers and merging competition phenomena. They found 
that a Pareto-improvement can be achieved by giving some priority to one of the origins through the use of ramp-
metering schemes.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 the structure of the model is established and the 
optimal ramp control schemes under short-run inelastic demand and long-run elastic demand are derived. The two 
distinguished, demand-based and space-based equity measures are then defined using Gini coefficients with Lorenz 
curves in Section 3. The relations among three typical ramp control schemes—optimum, perfect demand equity and 
perfect space equity—are investigated in Section 4. A real case of capacity allocation for the Beijing-Tongzhou 
Expressway in the Beijing metropolitan area is presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the 
contribution of this study. 
2. The model 
2.1 EQUILIBRIUM 
  
As shown in Figure 1, we assume a closed long-narrow city being developed in a one-dimensional space (Solow 
and Vickrey, 1971).2 Suppose that the central business district (CBD) is located at one end of the linear city and the 
residential areas are distributed from the CBD towards the boundary of the city along a freeway corridor B  km 
long. The land area of the CBD is negligible and each residential location is represented by a coordinate value in the 
one-dimensional space, with the CBD being the origin. The width of the freeway is assumed to be uniform with a 
capacity of μ  vehicles per unit time.  
 
0 B 
CBD 
μ 
q(s) 
           μ 
μ r(s) 
 
 
Figure 1. The corridor network. 
 
Similar to Zhang and Shen (2010), the no-inside-queue assumption is used in this paper and thus, the ramp 
control scheme is essentially a mechanism allocating the freeway capacity to on-ramp meters. We can simply use 
the following conservation condition to prevent queuing inside the freeway:  
 
2
 As mentioned by Mun et al. (2005), although this setting is adopted for analytical convenience, it is actually applicable to some 
places in the world (see, e.g., Tong and Wong, 1997). 
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0
( )d μ
B
r s s  ³ . (1) 
Although the on-ramp rates { ( ), [0, ]}r s s B  may vary with the time of day, here we assume that they are constant 
during the morning peak period because our focus is on long-run planning. 
 
It is further assumed that all residents in the city are homogeneous and the population density is unity throughout 
the urban area. Every morning, each resident chooses a transport mode, e.g. private car, to commute to the CBD 
from home with a preferred arrival time t . Let ( )q s  be the number of car trips generated at location s . For the 
short run, ( )q s  is fixed, while for the long run, ( )q s  is elastic and dependent upon the travel cost by car from that 
location to the CBD. These car commuters depart from their residences and head for the on-ramp meters, where they 
wait in queue and then enter the freeway when their turn comes and head for the CBD . 
 
For simplicity, the following linear inverse demand function is used: 
 ( ) ( ),   [0, ]D q s a bq s s B    , (2) 
where a  and b  are positive constants and ( ( ))D q s  represents the private benefit derived from a journey satisfying 
d ( ( )) / d ( ) 0D q s q s  . 
 
The trip demand generation is characterized as a situation in which the private benefit equals the full travel cost 
for every location along the freeway: 
 ( ) ( ),   [0, ]D q s C s s B   , (3) 
where ( )C s  denotes the full trip cost from s  to the CBD.  
 
This full trip cost, ( )C s , is formulated as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), ( )C s FC s DC q s r s  , (4) 
where ( )FC s  is the fixed travel cost for location s  and  ( ), ( )DC q s r s  is the travel delay cost due to the limited 
on-ramp  rate ( )r s  demanded by ( )q s  commuters at location s . As a congestion cost, ( )DC s  has the properties of 
d d 0DC q !  and d d 0DC r  . 
 
Furthermore, by keeping queues off the freeway, the traffic on the freeway propagates at free flow speed mv . We 
can thus assume that the fixed travel cost increases linearly with the distance to the CBD,3 i.e., 
1( ) αFC s f s   , (5) 
where 1f  can be regarded as the fixed cost associated with travel, such as the monetary cost of maintaining a private 
car, the constant time cost of entering and exiting the freeway, etc. and α  is the cost of unit travel distance. The 
second term in Eq. (5) represents the variable cost associated with the distance to the CBD, including the time cost, 
the fuel cost, and vehicle depreciation. 
 
Because every commuter has a preferred arrival time t  at the CBD and the travel time from on-ramp meter s  to 
the CBD is m/s v , the preferred departure time is m/t s v    for commuters from location s . Unfortunately, it 
cannot be guaranteed that each commuter will leave meter s at m/t s v
 
 and thus arrive at the CBD on-time due to 
the limited on-ramp rate. They have to make a trade-off between queuing delay at the on-ramp meter and schedule 
delay at work. Taking each on-ramp meter as a bottleneck, the arrival times at an on-ramp are chosen endogenously, 
resulting in a trip-timing user equilibrium in which no commuters can reduce their full trip cost by switching to 
another arrival time at the on-ramp meter near to their residence. Since the on-ramp rate ( )r s  is constant during the 
morning peak period, the duration of the morning peak period for ( )q s  commuters from location s  equals the 
demand-capacity ratio, ( ) / ( )q s r s , which is denoted by ( )u s  hereafter. According to the standard bottleneck model 
 
3
 It can be shown easily that the results derived in this paper can be applied to the case with non-linear travel cost after simple 
modifications.  
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(Vickrey, 1969 and Arnott et. al., 1993), the equilibrium delay cost is ( ) βγ/(β γ)u s    and the duration of the 
morning peak period for location s  is  
m m[( / ) ( )γ/(β γ), ( / ) ( )β/(β γ)]t s v u s t s v u s       ,  
where β  and γ  are the positive schedule penalty costs for a unit of early arrival time and late arrival time, 
respectively. 
 
With the above consideration,  ( ), ( )DC q s r s  takes the following form, 
   κ κ( ), ( ) θ ( ) ( ) θ ( )DC q s r s q s r s u s  , (6) 
where the positive parameter κ=1  is the elasticity of travel delay with respect to the demand-capacity ratio, and θ  
denotes βγ (β γ) . This equation has also been widely adopted in the literature (Arnott et al., 1998; Tian et al., 
2010, among others) by considering traffic delay cost as various functions of the flow/capacity ratio with different 
parameters κ  and θ . Furthermore, the travel cost from s to the CBD can be formulated as: 
1( ) α θ ( )C s f s u s   . (7) 
Substituting Eq. (7) into the trip demand generation condition (3) yields 
  1 1( ) α θ ( ) α θ ( ) / ( ),   [0, ]D q s f s u s f s q s r s s B         (8) 
which represents the one-to-one mapping relationship between ( )q s  and ( )r s , or between ( )q s  and ( )u s . In 
particular, ( )q s moves with ( )r s  in the same direction, while ( )u s  and ( )r s  move in opposite directions. 
 
2.2 SHORT-RUN OPTIMUM WITH INELASTIC DEMAND 
In the short run, residents tend not to change their trip decisions, and the demand distribution along the corridor, 
( )q s , is fixed and given exogenously. Let ( )TC r  denote the total cost, where ^ `( ), [0, ]r s s B r . Then, the 
system optimization problem is to minimize the total cost, ( )TC r . Since demand is given in the short run, 
minimizing ( )TC r is equivalent to minimizing the summation of the travel delay cost along the freeway ( )TDC r . 
Therefore, the capacity allocation problem is 
 
 
0
0
min ( ) min ( ) ( ), ( ) ( )d
s.t.                ( )d μ 
B
B
TC TDC DC q s r s q s s
r s s
  
 
³
³
r r
r r
. (9) 
 
With the definition of  ( ), ( )DC q s r s  in (6), the first order optimality condition of (9) is 
2θ ( ) η,   [0, ]u s s B   , (10) 
where κ  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with Eq. (1) representing the marginal reduced system cost of 
expanding the capacity of the freeway by one unit (the proof of this first order condition is provided in Appendix A). 
The left-hand side of Eq. (10) is the marginal system cost of adding a unit of freeway capacity to location s . As 
mentioned before, ( )u s  is the length of the morning peak period. Thus, the following proposition is reached: 
 
Proposition 1. In the short run, the optimal morning ramp control scheme with an exogenous demand distribution 
keeps each on-ramp location along the freeway at the same demand-capacity ratio, equivalently,  the duration of the 
morning peak period is the same everywhere, or all commuters using the freeway endure the same travel delay cost 
wherever they live. 
 
Proposition 1 states that, under the short-run optimal ramp control scheme with exogenous demand, the freeway 
capacity is shared equally among the car drivers, meaning that they endure the same congestion delay. Although 
derived using different instruments in different contexts, Proposition 1 can be compared with the result of the 
independence of the volume–capacity ratio of private toll roads obtained by Xiao et al. (2007) for a network of 
parallel roads, and by Wu et al. (2010) for a general network.  
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Rewriting Eq. (10) as ( ) η/θ ( )q s r s  , and then integrating it over s  on both sides yields the following 
equation: 
0 0
η( )d ( )dθ
B B
q s s r s s ³ ³ . (11) 
Substituting Eq. (1) into Eq. (11) yields  
2
η=θ μ
Q§ ·¨ ¸© ¹ , (12) 
where 
0
( )dBQ q s s ³  is the total trip demand along the corridor. Since Q P  represents the duration of the arrival 
peak of the freeway system at the CBD, Eq. (12) shows that the marginal reduced system cost of expanding the 
freeway capacity by one unit increases with the square of the system’s peak period duration. 
 
Substituting Eq. (12) into Eq. (10) yields  
( ) μ
Q
u s  , or ( )( ) μq sr s Q    [0, ]s B  . (13) 
Eq. (13) means that if the local authority wishes to optimize the corridor system with ramp control in the short run, 
the best way is to allocate the freeway capacity in proportional to local demand and keep the congestion delay at 
various locations at the same level. In practice, the short-run optimum scheme can be implemented by rationing the 
capacity to meet local demand along the corridor according to the “one person, one vote” principle. It can be 
regarded intuitively as the most equitable mechanism and, as proven later in Section 4, is perfectly equitable from a 
demand-based viewpoint. Additionally, such a scheme can also be verified easily by measuring the length of the 
morning peak period at different ramp locations.  
 
2.3 LONG-RUN OPTIMUM WITH ENDOGENOUS DEMAND 
 
In the long run, residents may respond to ramp control schemes by switching to other transport modes or even 
abandoning their trips towards the CBD by telecommuting. The car trip demand distribution along the freeway will 
change correspondingly. When Eq. (3) holds for all locations along the freeway, a spatial user equilibrium is thus 
attained, where no one could be better off by unilaterally altering his/her car trip decision. Consequently, the system 
optimization should focus on maximizing the social welfare with endogenous trip demand. Mathematically, we have  
( )
0
0
max ( )d ( ) ( ) d
B
q s
D v v C s q s sª º« »¬ ¼³ ³r , (14) 
subject to Eqs. (1) and (3). The first part and the second part in the bracket are the trip benefit and cost of 
commuting from location s , respectively. 
 
Similar to Eq. (10), using the Euler-Lagrange method, the first-order optimality condition of problem (14) is 
d ( ) ( ) λ,   [0, ]
d ( )
C s q s s B
r s
    , (15) 
where λ  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with Eq. (1) representing the marginal benefit of expanding the 
freeway capacity by a unit. Eq. (15) states that the marginal benefit of adding a unit of freeway capacity to any 
location s , which stems from the reduced equilibrium delay cost, should be constant along the freeway. This 
coincides with the traditional first-best result in the Network Design Problem (Yang and Bell, 1998). Hence the 
marginal benefit of capacity enhancement should equal its marginal cost. 
 
Substituting Eq. (7) into Eq. (15), we have 
d ( )θ ( ) λ
d ( )
u s q s
r s
  , (16) 
where 
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2
d ( ) 1 d ( ) ( )
d ( ) ( ) d ( ) ( )
u s q s q s
r s r s r s r s
  . (17) 
Combining Eqs. (16) and (17) yields  2oλ=θ ( ) 1 ε ( ) ,   [0, ]qru s s s B   , (18) 
where the subscript “o” represents the system optimum scheme and  
o o
o o
d ( ) ( )ε ( )
d ( ) ( )qr
q s q s
s
r s r s
   
denotes the elasticity of trip demand 
o ( )q s  with respect to the on-ramp rate o ( )r s  at location s . We call ε ( )qr s  the 
capacity elasticity of demand hereafter. It is clear that Eq. (10) is a special case of Eq. (18) with ε ( ) 0qr s  .  
 
According to Eq. (18), the morning peak duration, 
o ( )u s , always moves in the same direction as the capacity 
elasticity of demand, ε ( )qr s , along the freeway. Proposition 2 summarizes this property of the long-run optimal 
ramp control scheme with elastic demand. 
 
Proposition 2. Under the long-run optimal ramp control scheme with an endogenous demand distribution, the 
larger the capacity elasticity of demand, the longer the peak periods along the freeway corridor. 
  
As the capacity elasticity of demand ε ( )qr s  can be obtained by carrying out a questionnaire survey and ( )u s  can 
also be obtained by measuring the length of the morning peak period, the marginal benefit λ  at location s  can be 
calculated by Eq. (18). If  λ  is uniform along the corridor, the ramp control scheme is the long-run optimum. 
Otherwise, the scheme can be improved further. It is worthwhile to note that whatever the inverse demand function 
(2) is, Eq. (18) always holds. In other words, the optimal ramp control scheme can be achieved without knowing the 
exact form of the demand function. 
 
To gain more insights, the following assumption is introduced. 
 
Assumption 1. The equilibrium demand distribution is continuously decreasing with the distance away from the 
CBD; mathematically, ( )q s  is a continuous and decreasing function of s . 
 
Assumption 1 is popularly used in the theoretical literature and has been verified by many empirical studies in 
various cities around the world (e.g., Fujita, 1989; Anas et al., 1998; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009). Basically, 
Assumption 1 is equivalent to saying that the equilibrium full trip cost ( )C s  is an increasing function of s .  
 
With Assumption 1, we make the following proposition, which uncovers some characteristics of the long-run 
optimal ramp control scheme. 
 
Proposition 3. Under the optimal ramp control scheme with endogenous demand distribution, the ramp rate, o ( )r s , 
is a decreasing function of the distance away from the CBD, while the length of the peak period, o ( )u s , is an 
increasing function of the distance. 
 
Proof. Differentiating both sides of Eq. (3) with respect to ( )r s  yields 
2
d d ( ) 1 d ( ) ( )
=θ
d d ( ) ( ) d ( ) ( )
D q s q s q s
q r s r s r s r s
ª º  « »¬ ¼ . (19) 
Rearranging Eq. (19), we obtain 
2d ( ) θ ( ) ( )
=
d ( ) θ ( ) d d
q s q s r s
r s r s D q . (20) 
Substituting Eq. (20) and d dD q b   into Eq. (18) yields 
516  Qiong Tian et al. / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 17 (2011) 509–531
2
o
2
o o
θ ( )λ= ,   [0, ]( ) θ ( )
q s
s B
r s br s
  . (21) 
From Assumption 1, which states that 
o ( )q s  decreases with s , we can conclude that o ( )r s  also decreases with s  to 
keep λ  constant along the freeway. Note that Eq. (21) can be rewritten as: 
2
o
o
θ ( )λ= ,   [0, ]
1 θ ( )
u s
s B
b r s
  . (22) 
Since 
o ( )r s  decreases with s , the length of the peak period, o ( )u s , increases with s ƶ 
 
Comparing Propositions 1 and 3 and taking into account the elasticity of trip demand, we find that a higher ramp 
rate should be allocated to the downstream on-ramps to alleviate the degree of congestion experienced by 
commuters living downstream. 
 
Inspired by the proof of Proposition 3, we let 
2 2
2
θ ( ) θ ( )λ( )= = ,   [0, ]
1 θ ( )( ) θ ( )
q s u s
s s B
b r sr s br s
   (23) 
denote the marginal social welfare with respect to a unit on-ramp rate at location s , which will be useful in the 
following analysis on the equity of ramp control schemes.  
 
3.  Equity analysis 
There are two important tasks associated with ramp metering in both theory and practice. One is to equalize the 
ratios of the ramp demands to the ramp metering rates in space or time; and the other is to set a lower bound for the 
ramp metering rate or an upper bound for the queue length for each on-ramp meter regardless of the local demand in 
order to avoid inflicting driver impatience. In the literature, the first task has brought forth several equity concepts, 
such as temporal equity, spatial equity and temporal-spatial equity (Levinson and Zhang, 2004). For these equities, 
information on the time-varying origin-destination (OD) demand is usually required to measure the difference in 
travel time and travel delay among users who enter the freeway at various times and/or through different entry 
points. Hereafter, we call this kind of fairness demand-based equity. 
 
However, the time-varying OD demand information is not always available, especially for long-run planning 
when the demand is generated endogenously. Regardless of the demand, the differences in waiting time among 
various locations represent another fairness issue, which was not noticed as an equity measure until recently and is 
tackled by the second task. We name this kind of fairness space-based equity. 
 
In this section, these two equity concerns are distinguished in the freeway system and measured using Gini 
coefficients. The Gini coefficient of concentration (Gini, 1936) is calculated from the Lorenz curve (Lorenz, 1905) 
and has been used in economic studies to analyze income inequality. It is also applied to analyze inequalities of 
travel time and speed in ramp control (Levinson and Zhang, 2006). Here we give some interpretation of the Gini 
coefficient. Consider an allocation of resource Y to population X (Figure 2 gives a sketch map of the Lorenz curve). 
The Lorenz curve shows the proportion of X receiving a given proportion of Y. While 100% of the population 
receives 100% of the resource, the more unfortunate 50% may only receive 25% of the total resource. Then the Gini 
coefficient corresponding to this Lorenz curve can be computed as A1/( A1+ A2) in the graph. A Gini coefficient of 0 
indicates perfect equality, while a 1 indicates perfect inequality. 
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100% 0 
0 
100% 
Proportion of X 
Proportion of Y 
45 degree line 
Lorenz Curve 
A1 
A2 
50% 
 25% 
 
Figure 2. Sketch map of Lorenz curve. 
 
 
3.1 DEFINITION OF EQUITY MEASURES 
 
Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b) depict the Lorenz curves of space-based equity and demand-based equity, 
respectively. Similar to the ratio A1/( A1+ A2)  in Figure 2, the Gini coefficient for Figure 3, G, is defined as: 
OATSG
S
 , (24) 
where OATS  is the area between the Lorenz curve and the OT line and S  is the area between the OT line and the 
horizontal axis. It should be noticed that, although Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b) look very similar to Figure 2, their 
definition of the Gini coefficient is different from that of Figure 2 and the actual magnitude instead of the proportion 
is used to represent the Lorenz curve. 
 
 
 
 
O B  s  
A  
μ  
Lorenz curve 
T  
( )R s  
 
O Q  q  
A  
( )TC r  
Lorenz curve 
T  
( )C q  
 
L(q) 
 TD (r) 
 (w
 w 
 
                (a) Space-based equity                                                  (b) Demand-based equity 
 
Figure 3. Lorenz curves for the two equity measures. 
 
Space-based equity measures the fairness in the distribution of the limited capacity μ  among the on-ramp meters 
along the B km freeway. In this case, the Lorenz curve function in Figure 3(a) is  
0
( ) ( )dxR x r s s ³ , (25) 
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if ( )r s  is a non-decreasing function of s .4 The Lorenz curve reaches the maximum, μ , at x = B. Hence, the Gini 
coefficient of space-based equity is 
s
0
1( ) 1 ( )d μ
2
B
G R x s B  ³r , (26) 
where the subscript “s” represents space-based equity. 
 
Compared to space-based equity, demand-based equity is somewhat harder to calculate. In this paper, the focus is 
on the morning commute, in which the commuters make departure time choices based on the trade-off between 
queuing delay at the on-ramp meter and schedule delay at the CBD. In the equilibrium, even though the queuing 
delay time may vary among commuters, the full trip costs are identical for commuters coming from the same 
location (as in Vickrey’s bottleneck model, 1969). Thus, there is no need for temporal equity analysis and demand-
based equity reflects the difference in congestion delay among commuters living along the freeway. 
 
Demand-based equity on the other hand measures the fairness in the distribution of the total travel delay cost 
among the commuters living along the freeway. Suppose the individual travel delay cost across commuters is sorted 
in increasing order, let ( )l v  be the travel delay cost of the v-th commuter. Then the corresponding Lorenz curve 
function is given by  
0
( ) ( )dwL w l v v ³ . (27) 
Since ( )l v  is an increasing function, ( )L w  is convex. In addition, the Lorenz curve, ( )L w , reaches the maximum, 
( )TDC r , upon the integration of the total demand Q . Thus, the Gini coefficient of demand-based equity is 
   d
0
11 ( )d
2
Q
G L w w TDC Q  ³r r , (28) 
where the subscript “d” represents demand-based equity. 
 
Eq.(28) is difficult to calculate in the corridor system. Substituting functions ( )q s  and ( ( )) θ ( )l q s u s  with 
location variable s  into Eq. (28)  yields the following: 
 
 
  
 
  
0
0 0
d
0
0
0 0
θ ( ) ( )d ( )d
d ( )1 ,    if  01 dθ ( ) ( )d ( )d
2
θ ( ) ( )d ( )d
d ( )1 ,    if  01 dθ ( ) ( )d ( )d
2
B
B
x
B B
B
x
B B
u s q s s q x x
u s
s
u s q s s q s s
G
u s q s s q x x
u s
s
u s q s s q s s
­°°  d°°° ®°°°  t°°¯
³ ³
³ ³
³ ³
³ ³
r . (29) 
Note that to ensure that the commuters with a lower delay cost are integrated first, if ( )u s  decreases with 
distance s , the upper function is used to calculate  dG r . However, if ( )u s  increases with distance s , the lower 
function is used to calculate  dG r . 
 
In the following two subsections, we investigate two perfectly equitable ramp control schemes which give 
s 0G   and d 0G  . 
 
3.2 PERFECT SPACE-BASED EQUITY 
 
 
4
 If ( )r s  decreases with s , the definition should be changed to ( ) ( )dB
x
R x r s s ³  to ensure the smaller ramp rate is integrated 
first. 
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In this subsection, we investigate the ramp control scheme that achieves perfect space-based equity, i.e. 
s 0G  , 
which requires that the Lorenz curve ( )R x be just the straight line OT, whose function is (μ/ )B x . In this case, we 
have 
μ( )R x x
B
  . (30) 
According to the definition of ( )R s , Eq. (30) is equivalent to 
> @s μ( ) ,   0,r x x BB   , (31) 
which implies distributing the freeway capacity among various on-ramp meters equally. Under such a scheme, 
different freeway entry points give drivers the same access opportunity to the freeway regardless of the demand. Let 
s μr B  denote this constant on-ramp ratio. Substituting Eq. (31) into Eq. (4) yields the following full trip cost:  
s
s 1
s
( )( ) α θ q xC x f x
r
   . (32) 
Substituting Eqs. (2) and (3) as well as 
s μr B  into Eq. (32) yields 
 s 1μ( ) αθ μq x a f xB b   , (33) 
and 
 s 1( ) αθ μ
B
u x a f x
B b
   . (34) 
Furthermore, substituting Eq. (33) into Eq. (32) yields 
1
s
αμ θ μ( ) θ μ
bx Ba bfC x
B b
   . (35) 
 
3.3 PERFECT DEMAND-BASED EQUITY 
 
Similar to the case of perfect space-based equity, the ramp control scheme achieving perfect demand-based 
equity, namely d 0G  , also requires that the Lorenz curve and the OT line in Figure 3(b) match. It follows that 
> @d ( )( ) μ,   0,q sr s s BQ   . (36) 
The proof of Eq. (36) is provided in Appendix B. 
 
Eq. (36) implies that the ramp rate allocated to a location is proportional to its demand. We can also interpret Eq. 
(36) as saying that all commuters along the corridor should have the same access opportunity, something that the 
public would want. Substituting Eq. (36) into Eq. (4), we have the following full trip cost: 
 dd 1 d
( )( ) α θ q sC s f s
r s
   . (37) 
Let d d d 0( ) ( ) ( )d μ
B
u q s r s q y y  ³  denote this constant congestion delay throughout the corridor, then Eq. (37) is 
simplified to: 
d 1 d( ) α θC s f s u   , (38) 
which is a linear increasing function of the distance to the CBD. 
 
Combining Eq. (38) with Eq. (3), we find that both the demand distribution d ( )q x  and the ramp rate d ( )r x  are 
continuous functions of the distance to the CBD under perfect demand equity. 
 
Substituting Eqs. (2) and (38) into Eq. (3) yields 
2
d 1
μ αθ α(θ μ )( ) ( )θ μ 2μ μ
B B bq x a f x
B b b b
ª º   « » ¬ ¼
, (39) 
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and 
d d 1
α( ) (θ μ 2
B B
u x u a f
B b
ª º§ ·{    ¨ ¸« » © ¹¬ ¼ . (40) 
Thus, the perfect demand equity ramp control scheme is 
d
d
d
( )( ) q xr x
u
 , (41) 
and the full trip cost is 
2
1
d
α(θ μ ) θ μ αθ( ) θ μ
B b x Ba bf BC x
B b
     . (42) 
 
4.  The trade-off between efficiency and equity 
So far we have introduced the short-run and long-run optimums, and the two space-based and demand-based 
equity measures. In this section, we move on to look at the trade-off between efficiency and equity in the ramp-
controlled freeway corridor.  
 
To simplify our analysis, we first prove that two of the four typical ramp control schemes, namely the short-run 
optimum scheme and the perfect demand-based equity scheme, are basically equivalent. 
  
Proposition 4. The short-run optimal ramp control scheme is perfect from the demand-based equity viewpoint, i.e. 
the demand-based equity ramp control scheme induces the lowest system cost in the short run. 
 
Proof. Recalling Eq. (13) and comparing it with Eq. (36), we can see that the short-rum optimal ramp control 
scheme and the perfect demand-based equity scheme are identical.ƶ 
 
In urban transportation systems, efficiency and equity are usually regarded as two conflicting performance 
measures which are difficult to achieve simultaneously. Proposition 4 provides one example of both efficiency and 
equity being reached at the same time. Now only three different ramp control schemes remain to be studied—the 
optimum (or the long-run optimum) scheme, the perfect space-based equity scheme and the perfect demand-based 
equity (or the short-run optimum) scheme. In what follows, we will investigate these schemes from three different 
viewpoints—long-run efficiency, space-based equity and demand-based equity. We begin our detailed analysis with 
the following Lemma. 
 
Lemma 1. For any two of these three ramp control schemes—the long-run optimum ( or ), the perfect space-based 
equity ( sr ) and the perfect demand-based equity ( dr )—there is one and only one location at which the on-ramp 
rates are equal. 
 
Proof. It is easy to show that both or  or  dr  have a unique intersection with sr . This is because both or  and dr  are 
continuously decreasing functions of the distance to the CBD, while sr  remains uniform throughout the freeway.  
 
In the following, we prove that there is one and only one location at which or  and dr  intersect. First, there must 
be some points of intersection between or  and dr . Otherwise, the integration of one will be strictly larger than the 
integration of the other which contradicts the conservation condition (1). Second, we prove that such an intersection 
is unique. Let us focus on the length of the peak period under these two schemes. For the demand-based equity 
scheme, d d( )u s u{  is constant along the corridor. However, the length of the peak period under the system optimal 
scheme o ( )u s  is a strictly increasing function of s , as we have proved in Proposition 3 . Thus, o ( )u s  and d ( )u s  
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have a unique intersection. Recalling the one-to-one mapping relationships (8) between ( )q s  and ( )u s  and between 
( )q s  and ( )r s , we can conclude that or  and dr  have a unique intersection.  ƶ 
 
Lemma 1 shows that these three ramp control schemes almost never agree with each other. For any two of them, 
there is a watershed point at which the allocated on-ramp rates are consistent with each other. However, for the on-
ramps located either upstream or downstream of that typical point, the ramp rates are always different.  
 
4.1 LONG-RUN EFFICIENCY 
 
In this subsection, we quantify the long-run efficiencies of the two perfect equity ramp control schemes. For 
convenience of further discussion on the various ramp control schemes, Let 
sox  denote the unique location 
satisfying 
s so o so( ) ( )r x r x  and dox  denote the unique location satisfying d do o do( ) ( )r x r x . First, we compare the 
perfect demand-based equity scheme with the long-run optimum scheme through the following proposition by virtue 
of Lemma 1. 
 
Proposition 5. The allocation of ramp rate under the long-run optimum scheme is steeper than that under the 
perfect demand-based equity scheme. In other words, dos x  , d o( ) ( )r s r s  and dos x ! , d o( ) ( )r s r s! . 
 
Proof. According to Lemma 1, the ramp rate allocated at the unique intersection point dox  under the long-run 
optimum scheme is the same as that under the perfect demand equity scheme, i.e., d o( ) ( )r x r x . Thus 
d o( ) ( )u x u x  holds. 
 
As proven in Proposition 3, the length of the peak period under the optimum scheme, 
o ( )u s , decreases with the 
distance to the CBD. Because d d( )u s u{ , which is constant along the freeway, we can conclude that the intersection 
point between the optimum scheme and the perfect demand equity scheme is unique. Furthermore, s x  , 
d o( ) ( )u s u s! , while s x ! , d o( ) ( )u s u s . 
 
Let us revisit the trip cost function Eq.(8). By its definition, for any given location, a higher ramp rate will attract 
a higher trip demand and will also be accompanied with a shorter morning peak period. Recall that we have already 
proven that s x  , d o( ) ( )u s u s! , while s x ! , and d o( ) ( )u s u s . Thus, this proposition is true.   ƶ 
 
Next, we investigate the space-based equity scheme. Because sr  remains uniform throughout the freeway, while 
or  is a continuously decreasing function of the distance to the CBD, the allocation of ramp rate under the optimum 
scheme is definitely also steeper than that under the perfect space-based equity scheme. Together with Proposition 5, 
we are able to improve the efficiency of the two perfect equity ramp control schemes as shown in the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 6. Both the perfect demand-based equity scheme and the perfect space-based equity scheme can 
achieve a higher social welfare by reallocating more ramp capacity from upstream on-ramps to downstream on-
ramps. 
 
We can also perceive Proposition 6 as equalizing the marginal social welfare along the freeway. Recall Eq. (23), 
presented here again for convenience,   
2 2
2
θ ( ) θ ( )λ( )= = ,   [0, ]
1 θ ( )( ) θ ( )
q s u s
s s B
b r sr s br s
  .  
The equation represents the marginal social benefit with respect to the unit on-ramp rate at location s . We then have 
2
s
s 2
s s
θ ( )λ ( )= ,   [0, ]θ
q s
s s B
r br
  , (43) 
and 
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2
d
d
d
θλ ( )= ,   [0, ]
1 θ ( )
u
s s B
b r s
  . (44) 
According to Eqs. (33), (39) and (41), it is easy to show that both 
sλ ( )s  and dλ ( )s  are decreasing functions of s . 
 
Regarding the uniqueness of the intersection point dox , dos x  , d oλ ( ) λ ( ) λs s! {  and, dos x ! , 
d oλ ( ) λ ( ) λs s { . Similarly, sos x  , s oλ ( ) λ ( ) λs s! {  and, sos x ! , s oλ ( ) λ ( ) λs s { . Both of the two 
situations imply that switching a unit of ramp rate from an upstream on-ramp to a downstream on-ramp can be more 
efficient for the two equity ramp control schemes. 
 
 
4.2 SPACE-BASED EQUITY 
 
From the definition of the space-based Gini coefficient and Proposition 5, we obtain the following result. 
 
Proposition 7. 
s d s o( ) ( )G r G r . 
 
Proof. Because ramp rate allocation functions under the optimum scheme and the perfect demand equity scheme are 
both decreasing functions of the distance to the CBD, their Lorenz curve functions should integrate from the 
position s outwards to the boundary B , i.e., ( ) ( )dB
s
R s r x x ³ . With Lemma 1, we have  
d o( ) ( ),   [0, ]R s R s s Bt   . (45) 
The equation holds if and only if 0s  , where d o(0) (0) μR R { . From the definition of the space-based Gini 
coefficient (26), we have 
s d s o( ) ( )G r G r .   ƶ 
 
Proposition 7 shows that from the viewpoint of space-based equity, the optimal ramp control scheme is less fair 
than the perfect demand equity scheme.  
 
Substituting Eqs. (39) and (41) into (26), we can derive the following space-based Gini coefficient for the perfect 
demand equity scheme:  
s d
1
1 θ (μ )( )
6( ) (α ) 3
B bG
a f B
  r . (46) 
Eq. (46) shows that, from the viewpoint of space-based equity, a higher unit travel cost and congestion delay cost 
( α , θ ) and a longer freeway length ( B ) tend to make the perfect demand equity scheme more unfair, but a larger 
capacity ( μ ) and a larger demand elasticity parameter ( b ) tend to alleviate such unfairness. Interestingly, the 
following proposition gives s d( )G r  an upper bound. . 
 
Proposition 8. s d( ) 1 3G r . 
 
Proof. According to Eq. (39), d ( )q x  should be positive at the freeway boundary B , leading to  
1 θ1α 2μ
a f B
B b
 !  . (47) 
Substituting Eq. (47) into Eq. (46) yields 
s d
1
1 θ (μ ) 1 θ (μ ) 1( )
6( ) (α ) 3 3 3θ (μ ) 3
B b B bG
a f B B b
      r .ƶ 
 
Proposition 8 states that the upper bound of s d( )G r  is 1/ 3 . In other words, if the perfect demand equity ramp 
control scheme is adopted, its unfairness is limited even from the viewpoint of demand-based equity. 
 
4.3 DEMAND-BASED EQUITY 
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We now turn to study the long-run optimum and perfect space-based equity schemes from the demand-based 
equity viewpoint. Because 
s ( )u s  decreases with s , the first part of Eq. (29) should be adopted in calculating 
d s( )G r . Substituting Eqs. (33) and (34) into Eq. (27), we obtain the following demand-based Gini coefficient of 
perfect space equity: 
2 2 2 4 3 5
1 1
d s
3 2 2 2 2 4 3 5
1 1 1
1 1 1α( ) α ( ) α
6 6 30( ) 3 5 1( ) α( ) α ( ) α
2 6 6
a f B a f B B
G
a f B a f B a f B B
   
 
     
r . (48) 
 
If the reservation price of making a trip to the CBD, 1( )a f , is extremely large in comparison with the unit trip 
cost α  and the city length B , the demand-based Gini coefficient of the space-based equity ramp scheme will tend 
to zero. Conversely, a smaller 1( )a f  will lead to a higher d s( )G r . Unlike s d( )G r , d s( )G r  is not affected by the 
freeway capacity ( μ ) and the congestion delay parameter ( θ ). Clearly, d s( )G r  also has an upper bound. To put it 
differently, if the perfect space equity ramp control scheme is adopted, its unfairness is also limited from the 
viewpoint of demand-based equity. 
 
 
Proposition 9. d s( ) 1 5G r . 
 
Proof. Since 1( )a f  should be larger than αB  in order to keep s ( ) 0q x !  at the boundary of the city, the lower 
bound of 1( )a f  would have to be αB . Substituting 1( ) αa f B   into Eq. (48), the upper bound of d s( )G r  is 
obtained as 1 5 .   ƶ 
 
Because o ( )u s  increases with s , the second part of Eq. (29) should be adopted in calculating d o( )G r . However, 
due to the difficulty of deriving an explicit expression of o ( )u s , we can only make some qualitative analysis instead. 
Recall Eq. (22), presented here again for convenience:   2o oλ=θ ( ) 1 θ ( ) ,   [0, ]u s br s s B   . It is clear that in 
order to keep the marginal welfare of a/the unit ramp rate constant, o ( )u s  should change with o ( )r s  along the 
freeway.  
 
From the demand-based equity viewpoint, o ( )r s  could be regarded as a disturbance on o ( )u s : the smaller the θ  
and the larger the parameter b , the smaller the influence of o ( )r s . Hence, o ( )u s  tends to be uniform along the 
freeway. This is fairer in terms of demand-based equity. In particular, when trip demand is totally inelastic, b  is so 
high such that o ( )u s  is uniform throughout the corridor. This was proved in Subsection 2.2. On the other hand, since 
θ  is bounded by mαv , the optimal control scheme will not be too different from the perfect demand-based equity 
scheme. We summarize these properties into the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 10. The smaller the unit congestion delay cost ( θ ) and the larger the demand elasticity parameter ( b ), 
the fairer the optimal ramp control scheme from the demand-based equity viewpoint. 
 
We can check Eq. (22) on the basis of the space equity measure, i.e, by regarding o ( )u s  as a disturbance on 
o ( )r s . Given the parameters θ  and b , a more gradual o ( )u s  must be accompanied with a more evenly distributed 
o ( )r s . This is similar to the situation in which the two distinguished equity measures reach some conjunct point on 
assessing the optimal ramp control scheme. 
5.  Numerical simulations 
This section numerically examines the effects of ramp control schemes on economic gain, by comparing the 
values of social surplus under the long-run optimal scheme, the perfect demand-based equity scheme and the perfect 
space-based equity scheme. Because there are few empirical studies on the equity aspects in the demand-based and 
space-based viewpoints, we calibrated parameter values of the model using actual data for the Beijing-Tongzhou 
Expressway to obtain quantitative insights. The Beijing-Tongzhou Expressway is a part of the Yanjiao-Tongzhou-
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Beijing corridor and is located in the Beijing metropolitan area in China.5 The Beijing metropolitan area includes 
Beijing city and the surrounding cities. This corridor is the major thoroughfare connecting the surrounding cities 
with the Beijing city center. In particular, the commuters from the east side of Beijing including Tongzhou city and 
Yanjiao city in the metropolitan area utilize this corridor when traveling to the Beijing CBD. 
 
The parameter values for this corridor as needed in our model are as follows: 
20 kmB  (the length of this expressway is 18.4 km but we use 20 as an approximation); 
μ 4500 veh/hr (the expressway contains three lanes, with an approximate capacity of 1500 veh/hr each); 
(β,δ,γ) (15,20,30) RMB/hr (the schedule delay parameters in Beijing); 
θ=βγ/(β γ) 10 RMB/hr  ; 
m 60 km/hrv  (the free-flow speed along the expressway); 
1 4 RMBf  ;6 
mα 2 δ / 2.33 RMB/kmv    (including the trip price and the travel time cost); 
100 RMBa  (the maximum travel cost from the Yanjiao city boundary to the Beijing CBD); 
0.4 RMB/populationb  . 
 
5.1 EQUILIBRIUM PATTERN 
 
Figure 4 shows the simulated equilibrium pattern of the three ramp control schemes mentioned for the Beijing-
Tongzhou Expressway along four different aspects—ramp rate, demand distribution, peak periods and marginal 
social welfare. The blue solid, green dashed and red dotted lines represent the long-run optimal ramp scheme, the 
perfect demand equity scheme and the perfect space equity scheme, respectively. 
 
Figure 4(a) depicts the ramp rate allocation pattern under the three schemes. The ramp rate constant of the perfect 
space equity scheme remains constant at 225 (veh/hr/km) while that of the long-run optimal scheme is the steepest. 
This verifies the statements in Proposition 6 that both the perfect demand-based equity scheme and the perfect 
space-based equity scheme can approach the optimum more closely by transferring more ramp capacity from 
upstream on-ramps to downstream on-ramps. 
 
The induced trip demand is shown in Figure 4(b). It can be seen that the demand distribution patterns of all three 
schemes, especially the optimum and the perfect demand equity schemes, are very close to each other. Ramp control 
policies generally make the travel time along the freeway more reliable without much variance during the morning 
peak period. 
 
In Figure 4(c), the green dashed line, which is perfectly horizontal, represents the length of the peak period of the 
perfect demand equity scheme, implying that the congestion is endured evenly by every commuter on the freeway. 
The length of the peak period drops sharply under the perfect space equity scheme due to the demand dropping 
along the corridor while the ramp rate remains constant. The peak period function of the optimum scheme increases 
slightly as the distance to the CBD increases, which means downstream users are given more priority on the freeway 
for efficiency purpose. 
 
Figure 4(d) displays the marginal welfare, in which the blue solid line is associated with the optimum scheme. 
The marginal welfares of the other two equity schemes both decrease as the distance to the CBD increases, which 
means that reallocating more ramp capacity  from the upstream to the downstream can achieve higher welfare. 
 
5
 The population density in the Beijing metropolitan area is very high and is almost the same along the major corridors of this 
metropolitan area. The corridor in question can thus be assumed to have a uniformly-distributed population. Mun et al. (2003) 
and Tsai and Chu (2010) also adopted this assumption for Osaka Prefecture of Japan and Chinese Taipei in their simulation 
analysis. 
6
 1f  and α  are calibrated using the taxi data of Beijing. Taxis charge 10 RMB for the first 3 km and 2 RMB per km thereafter. 
Thus, we set the fixed cost per trip 1 4 RMBf  . 
Qiong Tian et al. / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 17 (2011) 509–531 525
 
5 10 15 20100
150
200
250
300
350
Distance to CBD (km)
R
a
m
p 
ra
te
 
(ve
hs
/h
r)
 
 
Optimum
Perfect demand equity
Perfect space equity
R
am
p 
ra
te
 (v
eh
/hr
) 
5 10 15 20100
120
140
160
180
200
220
Distance to CBD (km)
D
em
an
d 
(v
eh
s)
 
 
Optimum
Perfect demand equity
Perfect space equity
D
em
an
d 
(ve
h)
 
 
                            (a) ( )r s                                                                                (b) ( )q s  
5 10 15 200.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Distance toCBD (km)
Pe
a
k 
pe
ri
od
 
(h
r)
 
 
Optimum
Perfect demand equity
Perfect space equity
5 10 15 20
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Distance to CBD (km)
La
m
da
 (M
a
rg
in
a
l w
el
fa
re
)
 
 
Optimum
Perfect demand equity
Perfect space equity
 
                              (c) ( )u s                                                                               (d) λ( )s  
Figure 4. Spatial equilibrium patterns. 
 
5.2 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
To shed some light on whether the above results depend on the specific parameter values used here, we carried 
out simulations with various other parameter values to check the robustness of the results. A larger b implies that 
trip demand is less elastic. A smaller θ means that the congestion cost is less sensitive to an increase in the length 
of the peak period.  
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Figure 5. The relationship between demand elasticity b and economic welfare. 
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Figure 5 shows that, as trip demand becomes less elastic, the welfare loss of the perfect equity schemes becomes 
smaller while the total welfare decreases. Figure 6 depicts the variation of Gini coefficient with b . Four different 
types of Gini coefficients are illustrated, including the demand-based Gini coefficient of perfect space equity, the 
space-based Gini coefficient of perfect demand equity and both the demand-based and space-based Gini coefficients 
of the long-run optimum. Except that the demand-based Gini coefficient of perfect space equity (denoted by the red 
dashed line in Figure 6 (a)) is unaffected by b, the other three Gini coefficients all become smaller. This reflects the 
fact that the conflict between efficiency and equity diminishes as demand becomes less elastic. 
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Figure 6. The relationship between demand elasticity b and the Gini coefficient. 
 
On the other hand, Figures 7 and 8 show that, a larger θ  gives rise to a smaller total welfare and enlarges the gap 
between the various ramp control schemes from the efficiency and equity perspectives. 
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Figure 7. The relationship between congestion delay θ  and economic welfare. 
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Figure 8. The relationship between congestion delay θ  and the Gini coefficient. 
 
5.3 EVALUATION OF EXPRESSWAY EXPANSION 
 
Currently, the Beijing-Tongzhou Expressway does not connect directly to Yanjiao city, another satellite city that 
is farther away from Beijing than Tongzhou city. Commuters living in Yanjiao therefore have to drive to Tongzhou 
first and then access the expressway from there. Mindful of the huge boost in economy an expressway can bring to a 
city, as the Beijing-Tongzhou Expressway has done for the economy of Tongzhou, the local government of Yanjiao 
city has been lobbying for the Beijing-Tongzhou Expressway to be expanded 10 km outwards to its city for quite 
some time. Here we make an appraisal of the optimal ramp control policy if the Beijing-Tongzhou Expressway were 
to be expanded in both length and width. 
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Figure 9. Effectiveness of expanded freeway. 
 
In term of the effectiveness, Figure 9a and 9b show that the total welfare and the total demand are enhanced when 
the expressway is expanded in both length and width. In terms of efficiency however, increasing the length of the 
freeway, especially under a small capacity, enhances the welfare by a very minor margin only, while the demand 
will likely explode as a result. This leads to much more unfairness, as seen in Figure 10, in both the demand-based 
and the space-based equity viewpoints.  
 
Figure 10a and 10b show that widening the expressway improves space-based equity slightly, but lowers 
demand-based equity. The higher the capacity, the more harmonious it is between efficiency and equity. Thus, the 
lower right-hand corner of each figure is the area the local government should avoid in practice. The freeway 
expansion must be considered in both the length and width dimensions simultaneously. 
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Figure 10. Equity of expanded freeway. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, the efficiency and equity of ramp control schemes have been investigated by considering an 
idealized freeway corridor with limited capacity. From the efficiency point of view, both short-run and long-run 
optimal ramp control schemes have been obtained by minimizing the total travel cost under inelastic demand and 
maximizing total social benefit with elastic demand along the corridor. It was found that with inelastic demand the 
duration of the peak period is identical for all locations along the freeway, while with elastic demand the duration 
increases with the local capacity elasticity of demand along the freeway. From the equity point of view, two equity 
measures—a space-based Gini coefficient and a demand-based Gini coefficient—have been defined from the 
Lorenz curve. Two fair ramp control schemes—the perfect space-based and the perfect demand-based equity 
schemes—have been derived. Consequently, the short-run optimal ramp control scheme has been proved to be 
perfectly fair from the demand-based viewpoint and the other three typical ramp control schemes—the long-run 
optimum scheme, the perfect space-based equity scheme and the perfect demand-based equity scheme—have been 
compared to show their differences in efficiency and equity. Several interesting propositions have been proven. For 
example the long-run optimal ramp scheme has been shown to be even less fair than the perfect demand-based 
equity scheme from the viewpoint of space-based equity. 
  
Numerical simulations using parameter values based on Chinese data suggest that a perfect demand-based equity 
scheme attains an economic welfare level that is very close to the optimum and that the expansion of an existing 
freeway should consider both the width and the length aspects simultaneously in order to balance efficiency and 
equity. 
 
Finally, two limitations associated with our work are reiterated here. One limitation is that we’ve assumed no-
inside queues. Preventing queues from forming on a freeway can be beneficial for many reasons, but we did not 
prove that forming an inside queue will worsen the system performance for some commuters. Because of the 
dynamic properties of queuing, incorporating an inside queue on a freeway in a study is indeed challenging. The 
other limitation is that we’ve assumed the on-ramp metering rate stays constant during the morning peak period. A 
time-varying ramp metering rate should be better in allocating the limited freeway capacity. This extension may be 
the key to relaxing the no-inside queue assumption. 
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Appendix A. Proof of Eq. (10) 
Applying the Euler-Lagrange method, the first order optimality condition of Problem (9) is found to be 
 ( ), ( ) ( ) η 0( )
DC q s r s
q s
r s
w   w , 
where the first term is the marginal system cost of allocating an additional unit of freeway capacity of to location s . 
Substituting   ( ), ( ) θ ( ) ( )DC q s r s q s r s  into the above equation yields 
2( )θ η 0( )
q s
r s
§ ·   ¨ ¸© ¹ , 
which is equivalent to Eq. (10) as ( ) ( ) ( )u s q s r s .  ƶ
Appendix B. Proof of Eq. (36) 
Let  1dG r  denote the upper part of Eq. (29) while  2dG r  denote the lower one. It should be noted that whatever 
( )u s  is,    1 2d d 0G G  r r , because     
  
 
  
0 0
0 0 0
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. 
If  d 0G  r , both  1dG r  and  2dG r  should equal 0, namely 
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0 0 0 0
θ ( ) ( )d ( )d θ ( ) ( )d ( )d
11 1θ ( ) ( )d ( )d θ ( ) ( )d ( )d
2 2
B B
B x
x
B B B B
u s q s s q x x u s q s s q x x
u s q s s q s s u s q s s q s s
  
³ ³ ³ ³
³ ³ ³ ³
 
and thus 
   0
0 0
θ ( ) ( )d ( )d θ ( ) ( )d ( )d
B B
B x
x
u s q s s q x x u s q s s q x x ³ ³ ³ ³ . (B.1) 
Since Eq. (B.1) holds for any ( )q x , we consider the special case of ( )q x  being constant. Simplifying Eq. (B.1) 
yields 
0
0 0
( )d d ( )d d
B B
B x
x
u s s x u s s x ³ ³ ³ ³ . (B.2) 
As ( )u x  is a monotonic function, Eq. (B.2) holds if and only if ( )u s c , where c  is a constant. Substituting 
( )u s c  into Eq. (B.1), we obtain 
   0
0 0
θ ( )d ( )d θ ( )d ( )d
B B
B x
x
c q s s q x x c q s s q x x ³ ³ ³ ³ , 
which always holds for any continuous function, ( )q x . Thus, we can conclude  d 0G  r  if and only if ( )u s c . 
As ( ) ( ) ( )u s q s r s , we have 
> @
0 0
( ) / ( )= ( )d ( )d ,   0,B Bq s r s q s s r s s s B ³ ³ . 
 
Substituting 
0
= ( )dBQ q s s³ , the total demand along the freeway, and 0μ ( )dB r s s ³ , the freeway capacity, into the 
above equation, we have ( ) / ( )= / μq s r s Q  and thus Eq. (36) holds. ƶ 
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